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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of Swiss non-financial firms’ cash holdings over 
the 1995 to 2004 period. The median Swiss firm holds almost twice as much cash and 
cash equivalents as the median UK or US firm. Our results indicate that there is a nega-
tive relationship between asset tangibility and cash holdings and a non-linear relationship 
between leverage and cash holdings. Dividend payments are positively related to cash re-
serves. However, there is no robust impact of firm size on cash. We also cannot detect a 
significantly positive relationship between growth opportunities (measured by the market-
to-book ratio) and cash holdings, suggesting that the financing hierarchy theory is of little 
importance for the liquidity planning of Swiss firms. Dynamic panel estimation reveals 
that Swiss firms adjust their cash holdings only slowly towards an endogenous target cash 
ratio. Looking at a firm’s corporate governance structure, we reveal a non-linear relation-
ship between managerial ownership and cash holdings, indicating an incentive alignment 
effect and an opposing effect related to increasing risk aversion. Finally, our results indi-
cate that firms where the CEO at the same time serves as the COB hold significantly 
more cash. 
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1  Introduction 
Swiss firms, on average, hold much larger cash reserves than firms in most other countries [1]. The 
median cash ratio of a sample of 156 Swiss non-financial publicly-listed firms varies in a range be-
tween 10% and 15% over the period from 1995 to 2004. DITTMAR et al. (2003) compare the me-
dian cash ratios of firms from 45 countries, and in only seven countries the median firm holds more 
cash than the median Swiss firm. However, there are not only significant differences in cash hold-
ings across countries, but also between firms within countries. While differences in cash holdings 
between firms from different countries are strongly related to the countries’ financing practices 
and/or legal structures (e.g., shareholder protection rights), OPLER et al. (1999) document that dif-
ferences between firms within a country are largely attributable to fundamental characteristics (e.g., 
firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, and asset tangibility). 
In addition, firm-level corporate governance structures could have an impact on the amount of cash 
reserves. For example, using a sample of UK firms, OZKAN and OZKAN (2004) document that 
managerial ownership, board composition, and ownership concentration influence cash holdings. 
The peculiar characteristics of the Swiss corporate governance system allow another interesting test 
of whether agency problems between managers and shareholders affect a firm’s cash reserves. For 
example, in contrast to the Cadbury Report in the UK, the “Swiss Code of Best Practice” does not 
explicitly require that the role of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairman of the board 
(COB) are separated. Rather, it merely requires firms to “provide for adequate control mechanisms” 
if “for reasons specific to the company or because the circumstances relating to availability of sen-
ior management makes it appropriate”, the firm decides to combine the two functions [2]. While 
separation of the chief executive officer and the chairman of the board is common in the UK, the 
US is at the other extreme of leadership structures, where CEO duality is the prevailing model (e.g., 
DAHYA and TRAVLOS, 2000). Therefore, Switzerland is an interesting case to analyze, because it 
can be regarded as falling between these two prototype models of leadership. More generally, given 
that most empirical studies of the relationship between a firm’s cash holdings and its control struc-
tures relate to the US and/or the UK with their market-based corporate governance structures, it is 
interesting to explore this relationship for a continental European country (in this case Switzerland). 
In spite of its relatively large stock market capitalization, Switzerland is an example for an insider-
based system. Furthermore, the prevailing control structures will affect firms’ financial policies and, 
hence, the decision to hold more or less liquidity. 
In a frictionless world, a firm would not have to hold cash. There is no optimal cash level, and a 
firm could wait and immediately raise outside funds whenever internal funds are insufficient to fund 
projects. In reality, frictions will be responsible that cash holdings in fact do matter. A firm with 
sufficient cash holdings will not have to forego some positive net present value projects because of 
market imperfections, transaction costs, or asymmetric information. In addition, cash holdings re-
duce the probability of financial distress. In contrast, cash may itself be part of the agency problem 
within firms, weakening market discipline and increasing the entrenched CEO autonomy. Managers 
can have incentives to hold a large cash reserve in order to pursue their own objectives at the ex-
pense of those of shareholders (e.g., consumption of perquisites and/or making inefficient invest-
ments). Given that the theoretical predictions are ambiguous, it therefore remains an empirical ques-
tion whether cash holdings can be explained by a precautionary or optimal financial planning mo-
tive rather than by managerial opportunism (e.g., FAULKENDER and WANG, 2005). 
In this paper, we discuss the motives to hold cash and derive testable hypothesis. Our empirical tests 
employ an unbalanced panel of 156 publicly-listed Swiss firms over the period from 1995 to 2003. 
We use fixed and random effects panel models to analyze the determinants of the cash ratio. Our re-
sults indicate that the amount of a firm’s cash reserves is strongly related to leverage and asset tan-
gibility and, to a minor extent, to firm size, profitability, and payout policy. Extending the static 3 
 
model, we estimate the speed of adjustment towards an endogenous target cash ratio in a dynamic 
panel model. The estimated speed of adjustment coefficient of Swiss firms is between 0.35 and 0.5, 
implying that, ceteris paribus, the difference between the observed cash ratio and the target is re-
duced by 35-50% per year. Finally, we analyze the impact of corporate governance variables on 
cash holdings. Our results seem to suggest that a higher percentage of managerial ownership leads 
to lower cash holdings, indicating reduced agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. In 
contrast, when managerial ownership becomes large (in absolute terms), cash holdings increase. We 
interpret this result as reflecting managers’ risk aversion. In addition, CEO duality is associated 
with higher cash holdings. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey about the prior (theo-
retical and empirical) literature on cash holdings. The first part of section 3 contains a data descrip-
tion and develops our main hypotheses. The second part of section 3 presents the results from stan-
dard and dynamic panel models. Section 4 discusses the results of simple cross-sectional regres-
sions involving cash holdings and a set of corporate governance variables. Finally, section 5 con-
cludes. 
2  Motives for cash holdings 
In perfect capital markets, there is no reason for a firm to hold liquid assets. If cash flows are unex-
pectedly low, a firm can raise external funds at fair prices to keep operating and to invest into posi-
tive net present value projects. Assuming that there are no liquidity premiums and no negative tax-
effects  if  a  firm  borrows  money  and  accumulates  liquidity,  shareholders’  wealth  remains  un-
changed. Even if one believes that an optimal capital structure exists, it only applies to net debt, de-
fined as debt minus cash. Cash is merely negative debt and there is no optimal amount of cash. 
Changes in internal resources are the driving force for changes in cash holdings, but it is a matter of 
indifference whether a firm uses internal resources to accumulate cash and/or to repay debt (e.g., 
MYERS and MAJLUF, 1984; OPLER et al., 1999). 
Viewed from the opposite direction, if there is an optimal amount of cash, frictions must explain 
why a firm might not regard external finance as a perfect substitute for internal finance. The litera-
ture on corporate cash holdings emphasizes two major motives for holding liquidity: (i) the transac-
tion costs motive, and (ii) the precautionary motive. The transaction costs motive recognizes that 
raising external funds involves fixed and variable costs. The fixed cost component induces a firm to 
raise external funds only infrequently and to hold cash as a (costly) buffer. Therefore, for a given 
amount of net debt, there is an optimal amount of cash to be raised. In contrast, the precautionary 
motive relates to information asymmetries, agency costs, and the opportunity costs of foregone in-
vestments. If the adverse selection costs of external finance and/or the costs of financial distress are 
prohibitively high, firms accumulate liquidity to meet unanticipated cash shortfalls and finance their 
positive net present value investments. 
2.1  Transaction costs 
In the presence of transaction costs, a value-maximizing firm evaluates the marginal costs and mar-
ginal benefits of cash holdings to determine an optimum (e.g., KEYNES, 1936). On the one hand, 
economies of scale for raising external funds encourage firms to hold cash as a buffer and avoid 
frequent external fund raising (LEE et al., 1996; KIM et al., 1998). On the other hand, the cost of 
holding liquidity is its lower pecuniary return. In the presence of transaction costs, a part of the 
benefits from holding liquid assets is that they can more easily be converted into cash, i.e., there is a 
liquidity premium, defined as the opportunity cost for holding liquid assets. In addition, there is a 
tax disadvantage from a shareholder’s point of view. If a firm holds liquid assets, the accrued inter-
est income is taxed twice and shareholders could earn a higher pre-tax return from holding these se-
curities directly (e.g., MASULIS and TRUEMAN, 1988). 4 
 
The transaction costs motive leads to several predictions about a firm’s cash holdings. For example, 
the existence of economies of scale suggests that smaller firms hold relatively more liquidity than 
larger firms. One way to raise cash is through liquidation of assets (SHLEIFER and VISHNY, 
1992). A firm holding assets that can be cheaply converted into cash can raise funds at low cost by 
selling these assets. Therefore, firms with a high degree of asset specificity tend to have higher cash 
holdings. A related hypothesis is that larger firms are generally more diversified and can liquidate 
assets in non-core segments, allowing them to hold less liquidity (OPLER et al., 1999). Finally, a 
shorter cash conversion cycle implies better timing of incoming and outgoing payments, requiring 
smaller cash positions. In addition, firms with shorter cash conversion cycles tend to be diversified 
firms with multiple product lines, also suggesting that these firms hold less cash. In contrast, how-
ever, DELOOF (2001) argues that a longer cash conversion cycle reduces the need to hold liquidity 
because more receivables and inventories can quickly be converted into cash. 
2.2  Information asymmetries and agency costs of debt 
Information asymmetries 
MYERS and MAJLUF (1984) suggest that asymmetric information between managers and inves-
tors make external financing costly. In the presence of adverse selection costs, securities may be 
mispriced and firms prefer internal over informationally sensitive external finance. If adverse selec-
tion costs become extreme, a firm may find it more profitable not to sell securities and even forego 
investments. Therefore, it is valuable to build up financial slack (MYERS, 1984). This motive for 
holding cash is subsumed under the precautionary motive (OPLER et al., 1999) or the financing 
motive (DELOOF, 2001). 
There are two potential implications of the existence of adverse selection costs. If they are inter-
preted merely as an additional cost of raising capital, then a firm still faces a trade-off between the 
costs and the benefits of holding cash. In contrast, if one assumes that the costs of external financ-
ing are prohibitive a firm will generally avoid financing investments with external capital and ac-
cumulate cash. In this case, however, there is no target cash level. If the cost of holding cash is in-
corporated, i.e., the low return earned on liquid assets and increasing agency cost, there is only an 
upper bound from which on it is too costly to hold more cash. 
To avoid excessive adverse selection costs and being forced not to invest, firms with higher infor-
mation asymmetries will hold more cash. Most important, firms whose values are mainly deter-
mined by growth options should have larger cash reserves to avoid foregoing some investment op-
portunities. Growth opportunities are intangible assets by their nature, implying that growth firms 
incur higher bankruptcy costs and that their value decreases sharply in financial distress or bank-
ruptcy  (e.g.,  WILLIAMSION,  1988;  HARRIS  and  RAVIV,  1991;  SHLEIFER  and  VISHNY, 
1992). This notion also supports the hypothesis that firms with high research and development ex-
penses  have  more  incentives  to  avoid  financial  distress,  and  they  therefore  tend  to  hold  larger 
amounts of cash. In addition, transaction costs should be lower for firms that are stronger monitored 
and have better access to the capital markets. External monitoring is possibly stronger for dividend 
paying firms, and it might therefore be easier for them to raise funds. Alternatively, they could also 
cut dividends, implying lower cash holdings. However, a competing hypothesis is that dividend 
payers have a particular incentive to avoid a cash squeeze because they are reluctant to cut divi-
dends (BRAV et al., 2005). Furthermore, larger firms exhibit less pronounced information asymme-
tries (and lower adverse selection costs) than smaller firms (e.g., BRENNAN and HUGHES, 1991; 
COLLINS et al., 1981). Smaller firms also face higher costs of external financing than larger ones 
because they are more likely to face borrowing constraints (e.g., WHITED, 1992; FAZZARI and 
PETERSON, 1993) and because they cannot exploit the scale economies resulting from a substan-
tial fixed cost component of security issuance cost (e.g., KIM et al., 1998). Assuming that firm size 5 
 
is an inverse proxy for both the degree of information asymmetry and the cost of external financing, 
smaller firms can be expected to hold a greater amount of cash than smaller firms. This notion is 
also justified by the assumption that larger firms are more likely to be diversified and are thus less 
likely to experience financial distress (TITMAN and WESSELS, 1988). 
Agency costs of debt 
Agency  costs  of  debt  arise  when  the  interests of shareholders differ  from those of debtholders 
and/or when there are diverging interests between various classes of debtholders. Moral hazard 
problems make it difficult and expensive for highly levered firms to raise additional debt and/or re-
negotiate existing debt contracts to prevent bankruptcy. JENSEN and MECKLING (1976) argue 
that these firms have strong incentives to engage in asset substitution, making debt more expensive 
both in terms of the required yield and in terms of the covenants attached to the debt. Furthermore, 
highly levered firms will likely suffer from MYERS’ (1977) underinvestment problem, where the 
old shareholders have little incentive to provide additional equity capital even when a firm has prof-
itable investment projects because the cash flows from these investments disproportionately accrue 
to the creditors. In both cases, agency costs of debt are so high that firms cannot raise funds and 
forego profitable investment projects. 
A simple solution to avoid agency costs of debt is to choose a low level of leverage. PARRINO and 
WEISBACH’S (1999) simulation results suggest that both the risk shifting and the underinvestment 
problem increase with additional leverage. Alternatively, OPLER et al. (1999) argue that, holding 
the degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors constant, firms with high in-
vestment opportunities (e.g., as proxied by the market-to-book-ratio) tend to hold more cash be-
cause the costs they incur in financial distress are higher. These firms invest a lot and, hence, they 
hold more cash in order to pay for investments expenditures. 
2.3  Agency costs of managerial discretion 
Conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders can also relate to a firm’s cash holdings. 
One reason for managers to hold excess cash is that that they are risk-averse (e.g., FAMA and 
JENSEN, 1983; STULZ, 1988). Managers are not fully diversified because they cannot divide their 
human capital, and therefore more entrenched managers could hold excess cash to avoid market 
discipline. JENSEN (1986) argues that in the presence of managerial discretion, managers have in-
centives to hold large amounts of cash to have more flexibility to pursue their own objectives. Cash 
allows management to make investments that the capital market would not be willing to finance. 
Since excess cash holdings allow self-serving managers to avoid the discipline of the capital mar-
kets, investing in cash increases the costs of outside financing and can have detrimental effects on 
firm value. 
Empirical studies must employ variables that indicate to which extent a firm’s management is disci-
plined (or not) in order to analyse the relationship between agency costs of managerial discretion 
and cash holdings. For example, firm size is a takeover deterrent and, hence, larger firms tend to 
hold more cash. OPLER at al. (1999) suggest that firms with low debt tend to hold more cash be-
cause low debt makes the firm less subject to market monitoring. Similarly, STIGLITZ (1985) ar-
gues that there is little incentive for small shareholders to monitor managers because the cost of 
monitoring will likely outweigh the benefits. Therefore, one could hypothesize that firms with dis-
persed shareholders hold larger amounts of cash. In contrast, the existence of a large shareholder 
makes a takeover or a proxy contest a credible threat (SHLEIFER and VISHNY, 1986). When a 
firm has a controlling shareholder, another aspect is that the controlling party can appropriate pri-
vate benefits not shared by other shareholders (e.g., BARCLAY and HOLDERNESS, 1989; DYCK 
and ZINGALES, 2004). OZKAN and OZKAN (2004) argue that large shareholders might have an 6 
 
incentive to increase the funds under their control to consume private benefits at the expense of mi-
nority shareholders, e.g., by holding large cash reserves. A closely related hypothesis is that firms 
with deviations from the one share-one vote principle potentially expropriate minority shareholders, 
and one way to do so is to hold excess liquidity. 
JENSEN and MECKLING (1976) suggest that managerial ownership reduces the incentives for 
value destroying actions, implying a negative relationship between managerial shareholdings and 
the amount of cash reserves. At the same time, however, managers are risk averse and less then 
fully diversified, and they protect themselves from outside pressure by holding excess cash. In fact, 
OZKAN and OZKAN (2004) document that the relationship between managerial ownership and 
cash holdings is U-shaped. They explain this result by the opposing influences of an incentive 
alignment effect and an entrenchment effect. 
Another aspect that has increasingly gained interest in the corporate governance literature is the 
structure of the board of directors, such as board composition, board independence, board size, and 
the effectiveness of board work (e.g., HERMALIN and WEISBACH, 2003). For example, one may 
hypothesize that firms with more outside directors on the board are likely to experience a reduction 
in the agency costs of external finance and therefore hold less cash.
 Another aspect of outsider- vs. 
insider-dominated  boards  of  directors  is  whether  the  CEO  acts  simultaneously  as  the  COB. 
BEINER et al. (2006) document that firms that work under CEO duality elect significantly fewer 
outside directors into the board, indicating potential conflicts within the boardroom. Therefore, a 
testable hypothesis is that firms with dual CEOs also tend to hold more cash reserves. Furthermore, 
JENSEN (1993) and LIPTON and LORSCH (1992) argue that large boards are less effective than 
small boards, presuming that the emphasis on politeness and courtesy in boardrooms is at the ex-
pense of truth and frankness. When boards become too big, agency problems (e.g., director free-
riding) increase and the board becomes more symbolic and neglects its monitoring and control du-
ties. Therefore, given YERMACK’S (1996) empirical finding that larger board size leads to lower 
firm valuation, a testable hypothesis is that firms with larger boards encounter larger agency costs 
of external finance and hold more cash. 
2.4  Previous empirical results 
Determinants of cash holdings 
In an early study, KESTER (1986) compares the cash holdings of Japanese and US firms. In 1983, 
the average US firm held only 8.6% of its assets in cash, whereas in Japan the average was 18.7%. 
More recently, DITTMAR et al. (2003) analyze a sample of more than 11’000 firms from 45 coun-
tries. Looking at the median cash ratios, they document a wide cross-country dispersion. In 1998, 
the  median  cash  ratios  ranged  from  0.3%  in  Kenya  to  29.6%  in  Egypt.  PINKOWITZ  and 
WILLIAMSON (2001) explain the difference between Japanese and US cash holdings by the mo-
nopoly  power  of  Japanese  banks  that  persuade  firms  to  hold  large  cash  reserves.  In  contrast, 
DITTMAR et al. (2003) argue that the differences in cash holdings are attributable to differences in 
the corporate governance structures across countries. They document that firms in countries with 
poor minority shareholder protection hold up to twice as much cash reserves than firms in countries 
with strong shareholder protection rights. In contrast, however, the findings of KALCHEVA and 
LINS (2004) do not support the prediction that cash holdings are more valuable for firms in coun-
tries with underdeveloped financial markets. Similarly, HARFORD, MANSI, and MAXWELL’S 
(2004) report that US firms with weaker shareholder rights tend to have smaller cash reserves. They 
explain their results with the fact that in the US entrenched managers dissipate cash reserves (pri-
marily on acquisitions) more quickly than managers in other countries. 
JOHN (1993) presents evidence for firm-level determinants of cash holdings. Using a sample of 
223 US corporations, her results indicate that firms with higher costs of financial distress and higher 7 
 
cash flow volatility hold significantly more cash, while firms with higher leverage, higher growth 
rates, a longer cash conversion cycle, and more tangible assets hold less cash. While JOHN (1993) 
used time averages of all variables, more recent studies have applied panel regression methodology. 
For example, KIM et al. (1998) analyze a sample of 452 US firms over the 1975 to 1994 period. 
They document that cash holdings increase with higher market-to-book ratios and cash flow volatil-
ity. Their results also reveal that cash holdings decrease with firm size, leverage, the length of the 
cash conversion cycle, and the probability of financial distress. Finally, they report a significant re-
lationship between measures of future economic conditions and liquidity, implying that firms ac-
cumulate cash to be able to undertake future investment opportunities. OPLER et al. (1999) also 
employ a large sample of US firms and document very similar results. FAULKENDER (2004) 
analyses small US firms and reports that the determinants of cash holdings are somewhat different. 
Most important, he finds that small companies tend to hold more cash as their leverage increases, 
possibly because they have limited access to the capital markets [3]. 
Recently, several studies have presented evidence from outside the US. For example, using a panel 
of UK firms, OZKAN  and OZKAN  (2004)  confirm previous findings for the US.  KYTÖNEN 
(2005) and GARCÍA-TERUEL and MARTÍNEZ-SOLANO (2004) analyse Finnish and Spanish 
firms, respectively, and they document that firm size, growth opportunities, cash flows, leverage, 
dividend policy, and the probability of financial distress impact cash holdings. FERREIRA and 
VILELA (2004) investigate firms from the twelve EMU countries. They report that cash holdings 
are positively affected by growth opportunities and cash flows and negatively affected by asset li-
quidity, leverage, bank debt, and firm size. Finally, using a sample of Belgian firms DELOOF 
(2001) documents that a firm’s intragroup relations influence the need for liquidity. 
Cash, corporate governance, and valuation effects 
In an early study, PAPAIOANNOU et al. (1992) argue that there is no significant influence from 
managerial ownership on US firms’ cash holdings. OPLER et al. (1999) also document only a mar-
ginal impact from managerial ownership on the amount of cash holdings of US firms. In contrast, 
OZKAN and OZKAN (2004) report a non-monotonic relationship for U.K. firms. Cash holdings 
first fall until managerial ownership increases up to 24%, possibly indicating that the alignment ef-
fects dominates the entrenchment effect. Beyond this point, cash holdings rise until managerial 
ownership increases to 64%, and then falls again at higher levels of managerial ownership. They 
cannot detect a significant influence of the fraction of non-executive directors, a dummy variable 
for dual CEOs, and the presence of a controlling shareholder on this curvilinear relationship. In con-
trast, KUSNADI (2004) analyzes Singaporean firms and suggests that board size, insider domi-
nance on the board, and outside blockholders significantly influence the cash ratio. IONA et al. 
(2004) simultaneously analyze cash reserves and leverage. They treat a firm as financially conserva-
tive if it has both low-leverage and high-cash reserves at the same time. Their results suggest that 
managerial ownership, board composition, and, to some extent, ownership concentration influences 
the likelihood of firms to adopt a conservative financial policy. 
Conservative financial policies are often criticised as serving the interests of managers rather than 
those of shareholders. Therefore, two further questions arise: First, what happens to excess cash? 
Second,  does  excess  cash  have  a  negative  impact  on  firm  valuation  and/or  performance? 
BLANCHARD et al. (1994) document that firms do not pay out cash windfalls from a won or set-
tled lawsuit to shareholders, even if there are no attractive investment opportunities. OPLER et al. 
(1999) present evidence that excess cash is persistent, but they provide only weak support for the 
view that positive excess cash induces managers to spend substantially more on investment or ac-
quisitions. In contrast, HARFORD (1999) and HARFORD et al. (2004) conclude that cash-rich US 
firms are more likely to make acquisitions and that these acquisitions tend to be value decreasing. 
MIKKELSON and PARTCH (2003) examine the operating performance of firms that maintain a 8 
 
cash ratio in excess of 25% during five years. They document that following the five-year period 
the operating performance of high cash firms is comparable or even greater than the performance of 
matching firms. They conclude that high cash reserves promote investments without hindering cor-
porate performance. Weighting the benefits (avoiding transaction and adverse selection costs) and 
costs (e.g., double-taxation and managerial entrenchment) of cash, FAULKENDER and WANG 
(2005) estimate that the average marginal value of cash across all firms is $0.94. However, this 
value declines with larger cash holdings, higher leverage, and better access to capital markets. 
KALCHEVA and LINS (2004) report that shareholders tend to discount the value of firms with 
strong managerial entrenchment and high cash reserves, especially in countries with poor minority 
shareholder rights. Similarly, DITTMAR and MAHRT-SMITH (2005) present evidence that the 
market value of excess cash reserves is reduced by up to one-half when firms are poorly governed. 
They also document that firms with poor control structures spend excess cash more quickly in 
poorly performing assets. Finally, COUDERC (2005) investigates the influence of excessive cash 
holdings on firm performance with a sample of firms from Canada, France, Germany, UK, and the 
US. His results suggest that cash-rich firms perform worse. 
Target cash ratios 
OPLER et al. (1999) examine whether cash holdings are mean-reverting. They document negative 
autocorrelation and conclude that the hypothesis of the existence of a target ratio cannot be rejected. 
However, they emphasize that mean reversion is not inconsistent with a financing hierarchy model, 
where cash holdings are not actively managed, but the change in cash rather depends on the change 
in the growth in internal resources. If the growth of internal resources is negatively autocorrelated 
(e.g., because of business cycle fluctuations), then the cash holdings will also be autocorrelated. 
BRUINSHOOFD and KOOL (2004) investigate Dutch firms and interpret their results as being 
consistent with long-run liquidity targets at the firm level. Depending on the empirical methodol-
ogy,  they  document  that  the  rates  of  annual  target  convergence  range  from  20%  to  over  60%. 
OZKAN and OZKAN (2004) estimate dynamic panel models, and they conclude that firms have 
implicit liquidity targets. They report an estimated annual adjustment coefficient of 0.6 for UK 
firms. GUNEY et al. (2003) confirm these results for a sample of firms from the UK, Japan, France, 
and Germany. Japanese and German firms exhibit the lowest speed of adjustment, which could be 
explained by their close ties to banks (relationship banking). COUDERC (2005) also documents 
differences in adjustment coefficients across countries. He estimates higher adjustment coefficients 
for the US and Canada (over 0.6) than for Germany and France (roughly 0.5). Overall, to some ex-
tent these results support the dynamic nature of cash holding decisions, which are characterized by a 
trade-off between the costs of divergence from the target and the costs of adjustment. 
3  Cash holdings of Swiss firms 
3.1  Data description 
Our sample targets all 227 firms in the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) as of May 2005. We exclude 
financial institutions because their balance sheet is affected by exogenous factors, i.e., specific rules 
and regulations according to regulatory laws. In addition, we could not collect the necessary data 
for many of the smaller firms in the SPI. These adjustments leave us with an unbalanced panel of 
156 firms over the period from 1995 to 2004. The data are taken from the Datastream and World-
scope databases. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables we employ in our tests, and 
table 2 exhibits the corresponding correlation matrix. All variables are truncated at the 1% and 99% 
levels. 
[Insert tables 1 and 2 here] 9 
 
Cash ratio 
Swiss firms hold large amounts of cash. For example, in 2003 the 156 non-financial firms for which 
we have data available held almost 90 billion Swiss francs in cash and cash equivalents. At his time, 
their assets had a book value of 450 billion Swiss francs, i.e., almost 20% of their total assets repre-
sented liquidity. Figure 1 exhibits the median cash ratio of Swiss firms over the sample period from 
1995 to 2004. The median Swiss firm holds 11.4% of its total assets as liquidity, whereas the me-
dian US and UK firm holds 8.1% and 6.4% cash, respectively (DITTMAR et al., 2003). In an inter-
national comparison, therefore, Swiss firms tend to hold high cash reserves. Given that Swiss firms 
generally have close ties to banks (relationship banking), one could hypothesize that they should 
hold less cash. Bank monitoring decreases asymmetric information and the incentives for wasteful 
behaviour on part of the management, and these benefits could potentially eliminate cash hording. 
In contrast, however, using Japanese data PINKOWITZ and WILLIAMSON (2001) provide evi-
dence that main banks encourage firms in which they act as the principal monitor to hold relatively 
high levels of cash, predominantly to benefit the bank itself. While we cannot rule out this explana-
tion for our sample of Swiss firms, another explanation could be that firms had easy access to (both 
short- and long-term) bank debt as a means of financing with relatively low transaction costs. In 
fact, Swiss banks followed an easy credit policy during the last decade, and the total size of the 
Swiss credit market is large compared to anglo-saxon countries. For example, the total amount of 
bank credit granted to the industrial sector (excluding financial firms) is 41% of the Swiss gross 
domestic product, whereas for the US and the UK the corresponding numbers are 32% and 29%, re-
spectively [4]. A final explanation is based on the observation that Switzerland was not a booming 
economy during our sample period. In general, therefore, internal funds were sufficient to finance 
all capital expenditures, and the stable cash flows of many Swiss firms even allowed building up 
high cash reserves. 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
In literature there are two common ways to calculate the cash ratio. The first and most common 
method is to divide cash and cash equivalents by the book value of total assets (e.g., Kim et al., 
1998). Other authors follow OPLER et al. (1999) and normalize cash with net assets, i.e., book 
value of total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. To provide widely comparable results, we use 
both approaches to calculate the cash ratio. By construction, the first ratio, labelled CASH, is lower 
then the second ratio, denoted as CASHN. In fact, the median value in our sample for CASHN is 
12.9%, as compared to only 11.4% for CASH (see table 1)[5]. Three quarters of our Swiss firms 
have a cash ratio (CASH) below 20 percent. However, there are firms in our sample that hold up to 
90 percent of their assets as cash and cash equivalents. According to a Jarque-Bera test (Jarque and 
Bera, 1980), both CASH and LNCASHN are not normally distributed. One way to alleviate prob-
lems from non-normality in panel regressions is to use the natural logarithm of the ratio. As an ex-
ample, figure 2 shows the histograms of CASH and LNCASHN together with the Jarque-Bera test 
statistic. Truncating the data at the 1% and 99% levels, the null hypothesis that LNCASHN is nor-
mally distributed cannot be rejected. 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
Explanatory variables 
Firm size, denoted as LSIZE1, is measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of a firm’s 
equity (in thousand Swiss francs) in 2004. The median sample firm has a market capitalisation of 
CHF 300 million. Alternatively, we use the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets to measure firm 
size, labelled LSIZE2. The expected relationship between firm size and cash holdings is ambiguous. 
In the presence of scale economies, it is relatively cheaper for large firms to issue securities (e.g., 10 
 
BARCLAY and SMITH, 1995). In addition, large firms exhibit less information asymmetries than 
small  firms,  and  therefore  they  face  lower  costs  of  external  financing  (e.g.,  BRENNAN  and 
HUGHES, 1991; FAZZARI and PETERSEN, 1993). OZKAN and OZKAN (2004) argue that large 
firms hold less cash because they are more likely to be diversified and, hence, less likely to experi-
ence financial distress (e.g., TITMAN and WESSELS, 1988). In contrast, larger firms presumably 
were more successful and, hence, they have been able to accumulate higher cash reserves (e.g., 
OPLER et al., 1999). Furthermore, firm size can be regarded as a takeover deterrent. Managers of 
large firms have more discretionary power to hold excess cash without fearing a potential takeover. 
Because of the underdeveloped Swiss takeover market, the relevance of this hypothesis seems neg-
ligible. 
Leverage, labelled LEV, is measured as a firm’s total debt (short and long-term debt) divided by to-
tal assets. This measure only includes interest-bearing liabilities (RAJAN and ZINGALES, 1995). 
The leverage of half of our observations ranges from 12% to 35%. There are a few firms in our 
sample with over-indebtedness or without debt at all. There are several arguments in the literature 
suggesting that higher leverage should reduce cash holdings. In a pecking order world, debt grows 
when investment exceeds retained earnings and falls when investment is less than retained earnings. 
Cash holdings follow an inverse pattern of evolution, i.e., cash decreases when investment exceed 
retained earnings, and vice versa. This relationship between cash holdings, debt, and investment 
suggests that there is a negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings. In addition, firms 
with better access to the debt markets and/or bank loans have less need to hold cash. Finally, high 
leverage firms are more subject to investor monitoring, implying limited managerial discretion and 
lower cash holdings. In contrast, higher leverage increases the probability of financial distress and 
could therefore induce firms to hold more cash (e.g., OZKAN and OZKAN, 2004). In addition, 
high leverage provokes MYERS’ (1977) underinvestment problem, and holding excess cash mini-
mizes the potential agency costs of debt. From a theoretical point of view, therefore, the predicted 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings is ambiguous. 
We use three different measures for a firm’s dividend payments. First, we simply differentiate if a 
firm pays dividends by using a dummy variable, DIVDUM, that takes a value of one if the firm pays 
dividends in the given year, and zero otherwise. Second, we calculate the payout ratio, labelled 
POR, defined as dividends per share divided by earnings per share. Third, we calculate the dividend 
yield, denoted as DIVYIELD, defined as the dividend per share divided by the year-end stock price. 
As shown in table 1, in our sample 75% of the firms are dividend payers. The median dividend 
yield is only 2.18%. One hypothesis is that dividend paying firms are better monitored and can raise 
funds at lower cost. The possibility to reduce dividend payments in case of a liquidity shortage also 
justifies lower cash holdings by dividend paying firms. However, it is equally reasonable to argue 
that dividend payers are particularly reluctant to omit dividends and, hence, they tend to hold larger 
amounts of cash (e.g., OZKAN and OZKAN, 2004). In addition, the observation that a firm pays 
dividends may be the result of better corporate governance practices, which implies that dividend 
payers hold less cash. 
Profitability, denoted as PROFIT, is defined as the operating profit divided by total assets. On the 
one hand, more profitable firms use their profits to build up liquidity and, hence, they tend to hold 
more cash. On the other hand, profits provide an immediate source of liquidity. If cash and profits 
are substitutes, there should be a negative relationship. 
To estimate a firm’s growth opportunities, we use its market-to-book ratio, denoted as MTBR. As 
shown in table 2, the median value of MTBR in our sample is 1.5. The cost of incurring a cash 
shortage is higher for firms with larger investment opportunities due to the expected losses that re-
sult from foregoing valuable investment opportunities. In addition, growth firms are characterised 
by a higher degree of information asymmetry, and it is more costly for them to raise external funds. 11 
 
Both arguments suggest a positive relationship between cash holdings and the market-to-book ratio. 
In contrast, however, growth firms may simply not have sufficient cash flows to be able to accumu-
late, implying a negative relationship between cash holdings and the market-to-book ratio. Viewed 
from an agency perspective, entrenched managers of firms with poor investment opportunities are 
expected to hold higher cash reserves to invest, even if the net present value of the available pro-
jects is negative. 
The cost of liquidation is higher for a firm that sells unique or specialized products (e.g., TITMAN, 
1984). Accordingly, these firms should have an incentive to hold more cash reserves. We follow 
JOHN (1993) and use the expenditures on research and development over sales, labelled RD, as a 
proxy for product uniqueness and the potential cost of financial distress. For firms without declara-
tion, RD is assumed to be zero. Alternatively, we employ a dummy variable, RDDUM, taking on 
the value of one if a firm’s reported expenditure on research and development is greater than zero 
for a given year, and zero otherwise. Only 42 percent of the firms in our sample explicitly state that 
they invest into research and development activities. 
Following KIM et al. (1998), we use the inverse of an adjusted version of ALTMAN’S (1968) Z-
score (1/ZSCORE) as a proxy of the probability of financial distress. Compared to the original ver-
sion of the Z-score, we exclude a measure of liquidity to avoid circularity, i.e., to avoid that the cash 
ratio is explained by itself [6]: 
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KIM et al. (1998) predict a negative relationship between cash holdings and 1/ZSCORE, implying 
that firms with a higher probability of financial distress hold less cash. A negative relationship 
could also be interpreted as support for JENSEN’S (1986) hypothesis that financial pressure re-
duces the agency costs of free cash flow. However, the direction of causality is ambiguous, and an 
equally plausible prediction is that firms with a high probability of financial distress attempt to hold 
high cash reserves. 
We use the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, denoted as TANGF, as a proxy for asset tangibility. 
The median firm in our sample has 39% of its assets invested in fixed assets. Firms with more tan-
gible assets can be expected to hold less cash. Tangible assets can be sold in the case of a cash 
shortfall.  In  addition, firms with more collaterals encounter fewer problems to issue debt (e.g., 
TITMAN and WESSELS, 1988), and therefore they have less need to build up high cash reserves. 
To double-check our results, we also compute the ratio of receivables to total assets (TANGR) and 
the ratio of inventory to total assets (TANGI). High values of the latter two variables indicate that 
firms can quickly convert assets into cash, e.g., by factoring the receivables. 
The final variable we use to explain cash holdings is the length of the cash conversion cycle, de-
noted as CASHCC. This variable is defined as [7]: 
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CASHCC + × + × = . 
The median length of the cash conversion cycle of Swiss firms is 124 days, as shown in table 1. As 
discussed in section 2 above, one could hypothesize a negative or a positive relationship between 
the cash conversion cycle and the cash ratio. On the one hand, a shorter cash conversion cycle im-
plies better timing of cash flows, justifying smaller cash positions. On the other hand, a longer cash 
conversion cycle implies more receivables and inventories that could quickly be converted into 
cash. 12 
 
3.2  Results of panel regression tests 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of our baseline panel regression model, where CASH is the 
dependent variable. For each model, we report the results from both fixed effects and random ef-
fects regressions. The fixed effects estimator focuses on the differences within firms, whereas the 
random effects estimator also exploits the information of differences between firms. To distinguish 
between fixed and random effects, we report a HAUSMAN (1978) test statistic for each model 
specification. The null hypothesis is that the fixed and random effects estimators do not differ. Re-
jection of the null hypothesis is usually interpreted as evidence for the presence of fixed effects. All 
regression specifications include additional year dummies to control for variables that are constant 
across firms but evolve over time. The combined time-fixed and firm-fixed effects model eliminates 
an omitted variables bias arising both from unobserved variables that are constant over time and 
from unobserved variables that are constant across firms. To save space, we omit reporting the cor-
responding coefficients in table 3. All variables are again truncated at the 1% and 99% levels. The 
standard errors of the estimated coefficients are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the WHITE 
(1980) methodology. 
Instead of discussing every model specification in detail, we provide an overview of our most im-
portant results that are robust across all regressions. Our first result is that there is a negative rela-
tionship between firm size (LSIZE1 and LSIZE2) and cash holdings. This observation is consistent 
with the hypothesis that it is relatively cheaper for larger firms to raise external funds. It does not 
support the notion that managers of large firms have more discretionary power over investments 
and financial policies, inducing them to hold a greater amount of cash. A second result is the nega-
tive relationship between leverage (LEV) and cash holdings. This supports the pecking order theory, 
where cash holdings fall when investments exceed retained earnings and debt grows due to its lower 
adverse selection cost compared to equity. This result is also in line with the widely-held presump-
tion that higher leverage implies better monitoring and reduced managerial discretion. However, 
when we include a quadratic term of leverage, we find that the relationship between leverage and 
cash holdings is curvilinear. Specifically, the estimated coefficient on LEV^2 is significantly posi-
tive. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the probability of experiencing financial dis-
tress increases with leverage, inducing managers to hold more cash due to a precautionary motive. 
For highly levered firms, contingent claims analysis (MERTON, 1974) predicts that almost all firm 
value is in the hands of the debt holders. A small increase in cash reserves goes largely to increasing 
debt value, not equity value and implies that the probability of bankruptcy decreases [8]. 
[Insert table 3 here] 
The coefficients on all proxy variables for asset tangibility (TANGR, TANGI, and TANGF) are esti-
mated significantly negative. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that tangible assets can be 
sold if a cash shortfall occurs and that firms with more collaterals encounter fewer problems to issue 
debt. We also uncover a positive relationship between our dividend dummy variable (DIVDUM) 
and cash holdings [9]. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that dividend payers are particu-
larly  reluctant to omit dividends, and they  therefore tend to hold larger amounts of cash (e.g., 
OZKAN and OZKAN, 2004). In addition, in one regression model the coefficient on the inverse of 
ALTMAN’S (1968) Z-score (1/ZSCORE) is estimated significantly negative. This result is in line 
with JENSEN’S (1986) hypothesis that financial pressure reduces the agency costs of free cash 
flow. Finally, there is weak evidence for a negative relationship between the length of the cash con-
version cycle (CASHCC) and cash holdings. This observation could be explained along DELOOF’S 
(2001) notion that a longer cash conversion cycle increases receivables and inventories that could 
easily be converted into cash. 13 
 
We also document two negative results. Most important, and in contrast to other empirical studies 
(e.g., FERREIRA and VILELA, 2004), growth opportunities (as measured by MTBR) are estimated 
insignificantly in all four regression models. In addition, there is no reliable evidence for a relation-
ship between profitability and cash holdings. 
To test the robustness of our results, we use logarithm of our alternative definition of the cash ratio 
cash (LNCASHN) as the dependent variable. Table 4 contains the estimation results. The results re-
main qualitatively similar, and we therefore omit a more detailed discussion. 
[Insert table 4 here] 
3.3  Dynamic panel data estimation 
In this section, we extend the static cash holding model and formulate a partial (dynamic) adjust-
ment model. An implicit assumption in the static model is that a firm can instantaneously adjust to-
wards the target cash level in response to changes in firm-specific characteristics and/or random 
shocks. In the presence of adjustment costs, however, it may not even be optimal for a firm to im-
mediately adjust towards the target cash level [10]. Costly adjustment leads to a delay in the adjust-
ment process, and therefore a firm’s observed cash ratio is not necessary identical with the desired 
cash ratio. Following OZKAN and OZKAN (2004), we estimate a dynamic panel model, where the 
first lag of the dependent variable (i.e., the natural logarithm of the cash ratio) is used as an explana-
tory variable [11]. In general, this class of model allows analyzing whether current behaviour de-
pends upon past behaviour. In our context, the specific model describes the dynamics of cash hold-
ings by estimating the speed of adjustment towards an endogenously determined target cash ratio. 
As in OZKAN and OZKAN (2004), we assume that there exists an unobservable target cash ratio, 
denoted as CASH
*, which is a function of firm-specific characteristics and a disturbance term. Spe-
cifically, the target cash ratio of firm i at time t is modelled as follows: 




it x CASH , 
where there are k firm-specific characteristics suggested by theory. Actual and target cash ratios 
may diverge, and during each period firms partially adjust towards their target cash ratio. The speed 
of this adjustment process is captured by a constant adjustment coefficient, denoted as λ, hence, the 
adjustment dynamics are modelled as: 
(2)  ( ) 1 t , i
*
it 1 - t i, it CASH CASH CASH - CASH − − λ = . 
Plugging equation (1) for the (time-varying) target cash ratio into equation (2) for the adjustment 
dynamics delivers the following expression for a firm’s actual cash ratio at time t as a function of 
the lagged cash ratio at time t-1 and contemporaneous firm-specific variables: 
(3)  ∑ µ + α + α + γ + γ = −
k
it t i kit k 1 t , i 0 it x CASH CASH , 
with  λ − = γ 1 0 ,  k k λβ = γ ,  and  it it λε = µ ,  and  where  i α   and  t α   denote  firm-specific  and  time-
specific effects, respectively. Most important, the estimated value of  0 γ − = λ 1  measures the speed 
of  adjustment  towards  an  endogenous  (time-varying)  target  cash  ratio,  which  is  computed  as 
∑ γ k kit kx . An adjustment speed of 1 would indicate that firms instantaneously adjust towards their 
target cash ratio, i.e., 
*
t , i it CASH CASH = . In contrast, an adjustment speed of 0 implies that adjust-14 
 
ment costs are excessively high, preventing firms from active adjustments in their cash holdings, 
i.e.,  1 t , i it CASH CASH − =  [12]. 
In a dynamic panel model, a problem arises from the inclusion of lagged dependent variables. Since 
CASHit is a function of αi, it immediately follows that CASHi,t-1 is also a function of αi. Therefore, 
CASHi,t-1, a right-hand regressor in equation (3), will be correlated with the error term, implying that 
an ordinary least squares estimator is biased and inconsistent. In addition, shocks that jointly affect 
the cash ratio and the explanatory variables could lead to endogeneity problems due to an omitted 
variables bias. To address these problems, we use ARELLANO and BOND’S (1991) Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) dynamic panel estimator [13]. They show that first differencing the dy-
namic model in equation (3) produces an equation that can be estimated by instrumental variables. 
Using all possible lagged vectors of the right-hand side variables as instruments, their methodology 
exploits the orthogonality conditions that exist between these instrument variables and the distur-
bance term of the differenced equation. The resulting GMM estimator is asymptotically efficient 
and accounts for arbitrary heteroscedasticity. However, estimation problems incur from autocorrela-
tion in the residuals. While AR(1) autocorrelation of the error term in first differences does not af-
fect the properties of the GMM estimator, AR(2) autocorrelation leads to inconsistent estimators. 
Dynamic panel estimators have one-step and two-step variants, depending on the iteration process 
involving the quadratic form of the weighting matrix and the coefficient estimates. In our estima-
tions, we encounter significant second-order error correlations based on the one-step GMM estima-
tor, implying that the corresponding coefficients are inconsistent. Theoretically, two-step estimators 
are asymptotically more efficient than one-step estimators, but their estimates of the standard errors 
are biased downward in small samples (ARELLANO and BOND, 1991). To address this issue, we 
employ the two-step procedure and use the finite sample correction to the covariance matrix, as it 
has been recently suggested by WINDMEIJER (2005). 
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the dynamic panel model, where we treat all explanatory 
variables as exogenous (expect the lagged cash ratio). For all regression specifications, we present 
HANSEN’S (1982) chi-square test statistic for the null hypothesis that the dynamic model’s overi-
dentifying restrictions are valid (“goodness-of-fit”), i.e., that the estimated orthogonality conditions 
are sufficiently close to zero. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in any of the four model speci-
fications, which supports the choice of all lagged dependent variables from the second lag onward 
as valid instruments. 
[Insert table 5 here] 
As shown in table 5, the estimated speed of adjustment coefficient for Swiss firms,  0 1 γ − = λ , ranges 
between 0.35 and 0.50. The strong statistical significance of the estimated coefficients emphasizes 
that it is important to take the dynamic characteristics of cash holdings into account. With regards to 
the magnitude of the estimated coefficient, we find that the speed of adjustment of Swiss firms is, 
on average, lower than for US and UK firms (e.g., see OZKAN and OZKAN, 2004; COUDERC, 
2005). On the one hand, this result suggests that the cost of being off target is lower in Switzerland 
than in anglo-saxon countries. On the other hand, it may suggest that adjustment costs are relatively 
more expensive in Switzerland than in other countries. On a basic level, the slow speed of adjust-
ment of Swiss firms is consistent with their propensity to hold high levels of cash. Firms with slow 
adjustment towards their target cash ratio must hold higher cash reserves in order to avoid cash 
shortfalls that might require costly adjustments. Another explanation is the dependence of Swiss 
firms on banks for external financing and the accompanying easy credit policy of domestic banks 
during the last decade. Because banks serve as monitors, firms can adjust slowly towards their tar-
get cash level without incurring high agency costs. Another explanation is again based on the ob-
servation that Switzerland did not experience a booming economy during our sample period. In 15 
 
general, internal funds were sufficient to finance all capital expenditures, and with few good in-
vestment opportunities to come up (and a generally low probability to fall short of cash), it was not 
costly to deviate from the target cash ratio. 
In addition to the estimates for the adjustment coefficients, table 5 also presents the estimates for 
the determinants of the (endogenous) target cash ratio. Most of the results are qualitatively similar 
to those in tables 3 and 4, but somewhat less pronounced. For example, the impact of firm size on 
cash holdings is no longer estimated significantly. There are three additional noteworthy changes. 
First, two of our regression models indicate that profitability (PROFIT) negatively impacts cash 
holdings. This supports the view that cash and profits are substitutes, i.e., profits provide a major 
source of liquidity. Second, we estimate a positive influence of DIVYIELD on cash holdings, i.e., 
firms that pay relatively higher dividends tend to hold more cash. This result confirms our previous 
finding that dividend payers do not view dividends as a source of finance but rather avoid a divi-
dend curtailment due to costly signalling. And third, there is weak evidence that increased research 
and development activities (RD) lead to larger cash holdings, as could be hypothesized by theory. 
4  Corporate governance and cash holdings 
In this section, we analyse the influence of firm level corporate governance structures on cash hold-
ings. Because we do not have time-series data for most of the relevant corporate governance vari-
ables, we run simple cross-sectional regressions. As the dependent variable, we use the natural loga-
rithm of our firms’ net cash ratio (LNCASHN) as of year-end 2003. To account for potential en-
dogenity problems, the firm-specific variables described in section 2 above are taken as four year 
averages from 1999 to 2002 (e.g., see RAJAN and ZINGALES, 1995). In simple cross-sectional re-
gressions we also use constant variables that would have been eliminated in fixed effects regres-
sions. Specifically, we include dummy variables for a firm’s sector classification according to Swiss 
Exchange. In addition, we use the standard deviation of operating cash flows normalized by total 
assets (CFV). To compute this variable, we use data for at least five consecutive years before 2003 
(with a maximum of eight years). Most important, we include several corporate governance vari-
ables as right-hand side variables [14]. Due to data limitations, the sample we use for our cross-
sectional regressions only covers 118 firms. The cash ratio is observed in 2003 and is truncated at 
the 5% and 95% levels. Table 6 provides a detailed data description for the remaining 107 firms. 
[Insert table 6 here] 
 
Our first corporate governance variable is the total shareholding of a firm’s management (cumu-
lated voting rights, including board members) as a percentage of total shares (MOWNER). To the 
extent that holding cash is costly, and assuming that managerial ownership aligns the interests of 
managers with those of shareholders (JENSEN and MECKLING, 1976), one would expect a nega-
tive relationship between managerial shareholdings and cash holdings. In addition to this incentive 
alignment effect, lower expected agency costs increase a firm’s ability to raise external funds and 
reduce the need to hold large cash reserves. However, with very high shareholdings of managers, 
they may eventually become entrenched as they gain control over the firm and do not have to fear 
active  monitoring  by  outside  shareholders  (e.g.,  JENSEN,  1986).  This  entrenchment  effect  –in 
combination with the incentive alignment effect – implies a U-shaped relationship between manage-
rial ownership and cash holdings. As in OZKAN and OZKAN (2004), we test this hypothesis by in-
cluding a quadratic term of MOWNER into our regressions. To test higher non-linearities, we also 
include a cubic term. 
An  additional  hypothesis  is  that  very  high  managerial  ownership  makes  managers  risk-averse 
(FAMA and JENSEN, 1983). To test this notion, we also include the absolute value of managerial 
shareholdings (i.e., MOWNER multiplied by LNSIZE) as an additional explanatory variable. If risk 16 
 
aversion induces owner-managers to hold more cash, one would expect a positive relationship be-
tween the interaction term MOWNER*LNSIZE and cash holdings. 
To capture a firm’s ownership structure, we also include the percentage of voting rights of the larg-
est shareholder, denoted as LSHARE. In addition, the variable BLOCK is the percentage of cumu-
lated voting rights exercised by true outside blockholders, i.e., non-group listed companies, mutual 
funds, and pension funds with voting rights exceeding 5%. One would expect large outside block-
holders to be in a position to enforce the interests of shareholders and force firms to reduce exces-
sive cash holdings. Depending on the identity of the largest shareholder, the relationship between 
his ownership stake in the firm and cash holdings can be positive or negative, depending on whether 
the largest shareholder gains private benefits from holding cash or exerts his control function (to the 
benefit if minority shareholder), respectively. Deviations from the one share-one vote principle also 
offer opportunities to expropriate minority shareholders, and one possibility is to hold excess cash. 
Therefore, we include a dummy variable labelled SCAT, which takes on the value of one if a firm 
has more then one share category, and zero otherwise. 
To test whether the structure of the board of directors affects a firm’s cash holdings, we include a 
dummy variable, denoted as CEOCBO, which is one if the CEO simultaneously acts as the CBO, 
and zero otherwise. A testable hypothesis is that firms with dual CEOs serve the interests of the 
management team. One way to protect its position is to hold excessive cash. We also test whether 
larger boards with a presumably less effective decision making process hold more cash. The vari-
able BSIZE measures the number of directors serving on the board. 
Table 7 presents our results. All reported standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using 
the WHITE (1980) covariance matrix. The negative coefficient on MOWNER indicates that manag-
ers who own a high percentage of a firm’s shares have an incentive to reduce cash holding. This 
negative relationship between managerial ownership and cash holdings can be explained by an in-
centive  alignment  effect.  Although  the  coefficient  on  MOWNER^2  is  positive,  indicating  a  U-
shaped  relationship  as  suggested  by  theory,  it  is  not  statistically  significant.  The  cubic  term 
MOWNER^3  is  also  estimated  insignificantly.  However,  the  coefficient  on  the  interaction  term 
MOWNER*LNSIZE is significantly positive, indicating that managers’ risk aversion increases with 
higher absolute values of their ownership stakes, and this induces them to hold higher cash reserves. 
Overall, therefore, managerial ownership influences the cash ratio in two opposite directions. On 
the one hand, a higher percentage of ownership alleviates the conflict of interest between share-
holders and managers, implying lower cash ratios. On the other hand, cash holdings increase when 
the absolute value of managerial ownership is very high. 
[Insert table 7 here] 
Our estimations further reveal that CEO duality leads to significantly higher cash holdings. The 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient on CEOCOB indicates that, on average, the cash reserves of 
a firm with a dual CEO exceeds the (net) cash ratio of a firm with separated functions of the CEO 
and the COB by more than 30%. This result seems to support the hypothesis that one way for an in-
sider-dominated board to protect its own position is to hold more cash. 
For all other corporate governance variables, i.e., board size, ownership stakes of the largest share-
holder and outside blockholders, and types of share categories, we cannot detect a significant rela-
tionship with cash holdings. Finally, there is no evidence supporting the hypothesis that more vola-
tile cash flows, which potentially increase the probability of financial distress, lead to higher cash 
holdings. 17 
 
5  Conclusions 
We examine the holdings of cash and cash equivalents of 156 non-financial Swiss firms over the 
1995 to 2004 period. A main result of our analysis is that the median Swiss firm has substantially 
higher cash reserves than firms from most other countries. We also observe significant influences 
from various firm-specific variables on cash holdings, and our findings support different hypotheses 
derived from theory. According to the transaction cost motive, firms face a trade-off between the 
costs and benefits of holding cash. The strong negative relationship between asset tangibility and 
the cash ratio indicates that firms with assets that can easily be liquidated hold less cash to minimize 
the opportunity costs of holding cash. The observation that firms with higher leverage tend to hold 
less cash supports the idea that the opportunity costs of holding cash increase with leverage. In ad-
dition, we find some evidence for the hypothesis that large firms hold less cash due to economies of 
scale in security issuances. 
Other results also support the precautionary motive in the literature. The negative relationship be-
tween leverage and cash holdings is also consistent with the pecking order theory and increased 
monitoring, but the positive coefficient on the squared leverage coefficient indicates that firms tend 
to hold more cash when the probability of financial distress increases. In contrast, we cannot detect 
a significant relationship between the market-to-book ratio and cash holdings. Based on the precau-
tionary motive, one would expect a positive relationship because growth firms will avoid foregoing 
valuable investment opportunities due to cash shortages. Finally, we document a moderate positive 
relationship between dividend payments and cash holdings, probably reflecting firms’ reluctance to 
cut dividend payments. 
The influence of agency cost of managerial discretion on corporate cash holdings could also be sub-
sumed under the precautionary motive. While most of our corporate governance variables do not 
have a significant impact on the cash ratio, our results indicate that managerial shareholdings affect 
cash holdings in two ways. First, a higher percentage of managerial ownership reduces a firm’s cash 
ratio. Second, however, the cash ratio increases when the absolute value of managerial sharehold-
ings in a firm increases. The two opposing effects can be interpreted as an alignment effect and a 
risk aversion effect, respectively. Furthermore, a firm’s cash ratio is much higher if the CEO simul-
taneously serves as the COB, suggesting increased problems from an agency perspective under 
CEO duality. 
Finally, we analyse the speed of adjustment of Swiss firms towards an endogenous target cash ratio. 
The estimated adjustment coefficient from dynamic panel models varies between 0.35 and 0.5, indi-
cating that Swiss firms adjust slower towards their target cash ratio than firms in other countries. 
We suspect that the most reasonable explanations are based on the strong influence of banks in 
Switzerland and/or the unfavourable economic conditions during our sample period that entail low 
costs of deviation from the target. 18 
 
 ENDNOTES
                                           
  [1]   In what follows, the expressions cash, cash holdings, cash reserves and liquidity are synonymously used for cash 
and equivalents. 
  [2]   Banks are an exception, because the “Swiss Banking Regulation” requires a separation of the two functions. 
  [3]   BASKIN (1987) looks at cash holdings from a game theoretical point of view. He presents evidence for the hy-
pothesis that cash reserves can be used to signal a firm’s commitment to retaliate against market encroachment. 
  [4]   See Credit Suisse Economic Briefing 39 (2005), p. 26. 
  [5]   DITTMAR et al. (2003) also employ this second definition of the cash ratio. With this measure, for example, the 
median Swiss firm’s cash ratio is twice as high as that of UK 
  [6]   We use ALTMAN’S (1968) estimated coefficients, which are computed using a sample of US firms. 
  [7]   Due to data limitations, we compute CASHCC without accruals and taxes. 
  [8]   This notion also implies that the marginal value of cash to shareholders should increase as leverage decreases 
(e.g., FAULKENDER and WANG, 2005) 
  [9]   The coefficients of our alternative dividend variables (POR and DIVYIELD) are estimated insignificantly. 
  [10]   For a discussion in the context of optimal capital structure see Myers (1984) and Fischer et al. (1989). 
  [11]   Similar dynamic adjustment models have been used in the capital structure literature, e.g., DE MIGUEL and 
PINDADO (2001) and DROBETZ and FIX (2005). 
  [12]   Note that firms adjust towards a time-varying target. In fact, a firm could passively adjust towards the target cash 
ratio if it does not change its cash holdings, but rather the target cash ratio changes towards the actual cash ratio. 
For a model with a time-varying adjustment speed see DROBETZ and WANZENRIED (2005). 
  [13]   See also OZKAN and OZKAN (2004) and COUDERC (2005). 
  [14]   All corporate governance variables are measured as of year-end 2003. For a small number of firms that did not 
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The cash/asset ratio is calculated by dividing cash and equivalents by book value of total assets. The graphs exhibit the median 
and the 0.25 as well as the 0.75 quantile of the cash ratio of non-financial Swiss firms from 1995-2004. The number of observa-
tion varies for the different years and range from 88 to 156. 
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Jarque-Bera test statistic: 2559***                               Jarque-Bera test statistic: 79.09*** 
Without outliers:  
Jarque-Bera test statistic: 1082***                               Jarque-Bera test statistic: 4.027 
 
 
CASH is defined as the ratio of cash and equivalents divided by total assets. LNCASH is defined as the natural logarithm of 
cash and equivalents divided by net assets. 24 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
                 
variable  mean  max  0.75 
quantile  median  0.25 
quantile  min  std. 
dev.  N 
                 
                 
CASH  0.1480  0.7195  0.1962  0.1140  0.0587  0.0038  0.1259  1299 
CASHN  0.2126  2.5657  0.2440  0.1286  0.0623  0.0039  0.2798  1299 
SIZE  2710  123851  964  299  100  12  11680  1283 
LSIZE1  12.7598  18.6346  13.7791  12.6072  11.5089  9.3780  1.7783  1283 
LSIZE2  165.9716  347.2478  189.8642  158.9406  132.4550  87.9477  47.6270  1283 
LEV  0.2511  0.6850  0.3544  0.2417  0.1296  0.0001  0.1505  1271 
DIVDUM  0.7462  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.4354  1312 
POR  0.4026  2.8750  0.4581  0.3308  0.2344  0.0143  0.3262  911 
DIVYIELD  0.0232  0.0831  0.0315  0.0218  0.0143  0.0007  0.0124  935 
PROFIT  0.0511  0.2713  0.0867  0.0511  0.0217  -0.3204  0.0723  1309 
MTBR  2.2465  13.6703  2.6933  1.4953  0.9829  0.3840  2.0798  1239 
RD  0.0229  0.2888  0.0344  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0419  1340 
RDDUM  0.4232  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.4942  1354 
1/ZSCORE  0.3360  1.5099  0.4501  0.2931  0.1577  0.0013  0.2455  1152 
TANGF  0.3643  0.9426  0.4844  0.3381  0.2001  0.0317  0.2071  1297 
TANGR  0.1942  0.4703  0.2594  0.1889  0.1172  0.0088  0.1023  1291 
TANGI  0.1694  0.4593  0.2379  0.1721  0.0868  0.0031  0.1029  1288 
CASHCC  135  605  171  124  73  -1  89  1156 
                 
                 
The table shows a data description of 156 SPI non-financial firms over the period from 1995 to 2004. All variables are ex-
plained in the text and are truncated at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix 
                   
   CASH               
CASH  1.00   LNCASHN             
LNCASHN  0.92  1.00   LSIZE1           
LSIZE1  0.17  0.21  1.00   LEV         
LEV  -0.47  -0.51  -0.10  1.00   POR       
POR  -0.06  -0.07  -0.02  0.07  1.00   DIVYIELD     
DIVYIELD  -0.04  -0.06  -0.35  0.04  0.35  1.00   PROFIT   
PROFIT  0.07  0.11  0.18  -0.16  -0.10  -0.09  1.00   MTBV 
MTBR  0.13  0.15  0.41  -0.04  -0.03  -0.44  0.52  1.00   RD   
RD  0.20  0.18  0.30  -0.07  -0.06  -0.34  0.12  0.37  1.00   1/ZSCORE 
1/ZSCORE  -0.36  -0.40  -0.27  0.74  0.16  0.28  -0.41  -0.46  -0.21  1.00   TANGF 
TANGF  -0.41  -0.43  -0.31  0.27  0.11  0.20  -0.26  -0.31  -0.26  0.39  1.00   TANGR 
TANGR  -0.06  0.00  -0.02  -0.14  -0.09  -0.07  0.23  0.23  0.07  -0.29  -0.58  1.00   TANGI 
TANGI  -0.28  -0.22  -0.14  0.08  -0.14  -0.05  0.11  -0.02  0.10  -0.01  -0.37  0.36  1.00   CA.CC 
CASHCC  -0.03  -0.04  0.37  0.01  -0.06  -0.30  0.08  0.19  0.58  -0.07  -0.29  -0.01  0.44  1.00 
                             
 
This table presents Pearson’s correlation coefficients calculated with the values of the whole sample over the 1995-2004 pe-





Table 3: Cross-sectional time-series regression results 
                 
                 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
                 
  fixed ef.  rand. ef.  fixed ef.  rand. ef.  fixed ef.  rand. ef.  fixed ef.  rand. ef. 
                 
                 
Dependent:  CASH  CASH  CASH  CASH  CASH  CASH  CASH  CASH 
                
LSIZE1      -0.031***      -0.017***  -0.009  0.004         
  (-5.70)  (-5.08)  (-1.45)  (1.05)         
                 
LSIZE2                                                              -0.025**  -0.006      -0.026**  -0.006 
          (-2.05)  (-1.47)  (-2.15)  (-1.38) 
                 
LEV  -0.148      -0.201**      -0.440***      -0.503***      -0.429***      -0.529***      -0.426***      -0.522*** 
  (-1.58)  (-2.41)  (-5.30)  (-6.46)  (-4.34)  (-6.20)  (-4.14)  (-5.90) 
                 
LEV^2  -0.001  0.042       0.502***       0.560***       0.491**       0.578***       0.488**       0.568*** 
  (-0.01)  (0.32)  (3.77)  (4.66)  (3.09)  (4.37)  (3.05)  (4.18) 
                 
TANGR      -0.569***      -0.549***                                                                                     
  (-7.01)  (-9.19)             
                 
TANGI      -0.597***      -0.575***             
  (-8.66)  (-10.63)             
                 
TANGF      -0.569***      -0.547***      -0.370***      -0.309***      -0.409***      -0.270***      -0.409***      -0.274*** 
  (-12.77)  (-14.5)  (-7.59)  (-10.31)  (-7.67)  (-8.66)  (-7.60)  (-8.67) 
                 
RDDUM  -0.007  -0.007  0.001  -0.001                                                        
  (-0.77)  (-0.91)  (0.13)  (-0.16)         
                 
RD                                                         0.181       0.295*   0.126  0.252 
          (0.80)  (1.88)  (0.55)  (1.60) 
                 
PROFIT  0.074  -0.032  -0.061      -0.158*   -0.031  -0.065  -0.026  -0.054 
  (1.20)  (-0.55)  (-0.83)  (-1.90)  (-0.27)  (-0.64)  (-0.23)  (-0.53) 
                 
DIVDUM       0.013*        0.013*        0.021**       0.020**                                                         
  (1.85)  (1.90)  (2.66)  (2.68)         
                 
POR                                                                                     0.000  0.002 
              (0.03)  (0.16) 
                 
DIVYIELD                                                         0.402  0.463                             
          (1.05)  (1.27)     
                 
1/ZSCORE       -0.052*   -0.034                                                                                     
  (-1.94)  (-1.43)             
                 
MTBR  0.004  0.003  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.002  0.000 
  (1.47)  (1.3)  (-1.07)  (-0.56)  (-0.37)  (0.50)  (-0.81)  (-0.09) 
                 
CASHCC  0.048  0.033      -0.269***      -0.238***                                                         
  (0.51)  (0.46)  (-4.08)  (-4.05)         
                 
Constant       1.024***       0.848***       0.512***       0.343***       0.712***       0.413***       0.735***       0.421*** 
  (12.42)  (13.88)  (6.50)  (7.10)  (4.44)  (6.19)  (4.64)  (6.31) 
                 
R
2 within  0.470  0.464  0.254  0.242  0.241  0.223  0.235  0.218 
R
2 between  0.563  0.633  0.266  0.371  0.255  0.363  0.233  0.342 
R
2 overall  0.538  0.587  0.248  0.317  0.224  0.315  0.214  0.306 
Observ.  919  919  992  992  852  852  847  847 
Groups  144  144  147  147  135  135  134  134 
                 
Hausman  201.98***  -57.85  30.95**  -36.90 
                 
                 
This table presents panel data regressions with fixed and random effects. All variables are truncated at the 1% and 99% levels. 
CASH is the dependent variable; it is calculated by dividing cash and equivalents by total assets. All explanatory variables are 
explained in the text. The last row shows the value of a Hausman (1978) statistic. For the fixed effects estimation, the t-statistic 
and for the random effects estimation the z-statistics are shown in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all specifications. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The coefficient of CASHCC is multiplied by a 
factor 1’000. 26 
 
 
Table 4: Cross-sectional time-series regression results with LNCASHN 
                 
                 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
                 
  fixed ef.  rand. ef.  fixed ef.  rand. ef.  fixed ef.  rand. ef.  fixed ef.  rand. ef. 
                 
                 
Dependent:  LNCASHN  LNCASHN  LNCASHN  LNCASHN  LNCASHN  LNCASHN  LNCASHN  LNCASHN 
                
LSIZE1      -0.309***      -0.104***      -0.145**  0.043                                                         
  (-6.41)  (-3.95)  (-2.93)  (1.41)         
                 
LSIZE2              -0.276**  -0.028      -0.286**  -0.033 
          (-2.87)  (-0.76)  (-3.05)  (-0.87) 
                 
LEV  -0.410  -0.939      -2.616***      -3.042***      -2.469***      -3.264***      -2.410**      -3.217*** 
  (-0.60)  (-1.59)  (-4.40)  (-5.39)  (-3.45)  (-5.09)  (-3.30)  (-4.91) 
                 
LEV^2  -1.095  -1.027       2.508**       2.774**       2.609**       2.808**       2.495**       2.789** 
  (-0.93)  (-0.96)  (2.39)  (2.82)  (2.11)  (2.53)  (2.01)  (2.46) 
                 
TANGR      -4.206***      -3.937***             
  (-7.26)  (-9.01)             
                 
TANGI      -3.815***      -3.816***             
  (-7.27)  (-9.01)             
                 
TANGF      -4.397***      -4.333***      -2.863***      -2.668***      -3.256***      -2.437***      -3.291***      -2.478*** 
  (-15.22)  (-19.03)  (-7.95)  (-11.47)  (-7.92)  (-8.95)  (-7.93)  (-9.00) 
                 
RDDUM      -0.162*   -0.119  -0.121  -0.091         
  (-1.76)  (-1.59)  (-1.35)  (-1.20)         
                 
RD          0.570  1.551  0.231  1.239 
          (0.34)  (1.38)  (0.14)  (1.10) 
                 
PROFIT       0.952*   0.076  -0.056  -0.816  0.214  -0.003  0.022  -0.103 
  (1.79)  (0.18)  (-0.09)  (-1.45)  (0.24)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (-0.14) 
                 
DIVDUM  0.034  0.015       0.107*   0.083         
  (0.57)  (0.27)  (1.70)  (1.31)         
                 
POR              -0.081  -0.067 
              (-0.88)  (-0.75) 
                 
DIVYIELD          2.095  2.62     
          (0.75)  (0.99)     
                 
1/ZSCORE      -0.506**  -0.253             
  (-2.07)  (-1.22)             
                 
MTBR        0.037*   0.022  -0.010  -0.013  -0.019  -0.001  -0.021  -0.006 
  (1.94)  (1.36)  (-0.60)  (-0.76)  (-0.91)  (-0.05)  (-1.08)  (-0.38) 
                 
CASHCC  0.174  0.373      -2.581***      -2.295***         
  (-0.22)  (-0.59)  (-4.81)  (-4.40)         
                 
Constant       5.466***       2.905***       1.704**  -0.640       3.291**  -0.220       3.504**  -0.058 
  (8.04)  (7.41)  (2.63)  (-1.61)  (2.60)  (-0.39)  (2.86)  (-0.10) 
                 
R
2 within  0.387  0.369  0.224  0.203  0.208  0.187  0.211  0.191 
R
2 between  0.427  0.647  0.229  0.469  0.197  0.399  0.179  0.368 
R
2 overall  0.392  0.557  0.203  0.363  0.173  0.324  0.17  0.319 
Observ.  916  916  989  989  851  851  846  846 
Groups  143  143  146  146  135  135  134  134 
                 
Hausman  91.25***  -203.24  27.75**  -47.34 
                 
                 
This table presents panel data regressions with fixed and random effects. All variables are truncated at the 1% and 99% levels. 
LNCASHN is the dependent variable, it is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash & equivalents and net assets 
(i.e., total assets minus cash). All explanatory variables are explained in the text. The last row shows the value of a Hausman 
(1978) statistic. For the fixed effects estimation the t-statistic and for the random effects estimation the z-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. Year dummies are included in all specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 




Table 5: Dynamic panel data estimation results without outliers 
         
         
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
         
Dependent:  CASH  CASH  LNCASHN  LNCASHN 
         
CASH(t-1)       0.624***       0.641***       0.502***       0.515*** 
  (8.12)  (8.00)  (4.68)  (4.68) 
                                 
LSIZE2  -0.001  -0.001  0.008  0.008 
  (-0.42)  (-0.57)  (0.29)  (0.27) 
         
LEV      -0.298**      -0.301**      -2.683**      -2.717** 
  (-2.58)  (-2.42)  (-2.44)  (-2.55) 
         
LEV^2       0.321**       0.340*   1.829  2.081 
  (2.01)  (1.96)  (1.05)  (1.23) 
         
TANGF      -0.064**      -0.060**      -0.920**      -0.855** 
  (-2.94)  (-2.72)  (-2.76)  (-2.60) 
         
RD       0.163*   0.109  0.953  0.656 
  (1.76)  (1.09)  (1.06)  (0.76) 
         
PROFIT      -0.179**      -0.136*   -1.154  -0.855 
  (-2.12)  (-1.71)  (-1.55)  (-1.21) 
         
POR                -0.004                -0.046 
    (-0.37)    (-0.46) 
         
DIVYIELD  0.529                     5.273*                
  (1.33)    (1.86)   
         
MTBR  0.003  0.002  0.030  0.016 
  (1.42)  (0.80)  (1.60)  (0.94) 
         
Constant       0.134**       0.134**  -0.256  -0.468 
  (2.82)  (3.07)  (-0.55)  (-1.02) 
         
Correl. 2  -0.811  -0.811  -0.946  -0.594 
Hansen test  41.314  43.922  41.470  41.557 
Observ.  766  761  764  759 
Groups  132  131  132  130 
         
         
This table presents the estimates of a two-step dynamic GMM estimation. All variables are truncated at the 1% and 99% lev-
els. CASH is calculated by dividing cash & equivalents by total assets. LNCASHN is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash 
& equivalents and net assets (i.e., total assets minus cash). All explanatory variables are explained in the text. Correl. 2 is the 
Arellano-Bond (1991) test statistic for the null hypothesis that there is no second-order correlation in residuals. The Hansen 
(1982) test shows the statistic for the null hypothesis that all estimated orthogonality conditions are zero. The z-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 28 
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics 
               
variable  mean  max  0.75 
quantile  median  0.25 
quantile  min  std. 
dev. 
               
               
CASH  0.143  0.328  0.222  0.120  0.065  0.014  0.094 
LNCASHN  -2.057  -0.717  -1.254  -1.988  -2.664  -4.283  0.921 
LNSIZE  12.958  18.755  13.960  12.678  11.532  9.376  1.986 
LEV  0.260  0.532  0.362  0.266  0.172  0.021  0.127 
LEV_2  0.089  0.346  0.133  0.074  0.031  0.000  0.073 
TANGF  0.357  0.917  0.449  0.340  0.200  0.066  0.194 
RD  0.025  0.235  0.034  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.042 
DIVYIELD  0.019  0.089  0.028  0.017  0.008  0.000  0.015 
MTBV  2.589  12.956  3.064  1.740  1.127  0.431  2.245 
CFV  0.047  0.240  0.056  0.036  0.025  0.012  0.039 
MOWNER  0.170  0.680  0.342  0.053  0.004  0.000  0.208 
CEOCOB  0.178  1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.384 
LSHARE  6.766  14.000  8.000  7.000  5.000  3.000  2.139 
BLOCK  0.210  0.920  0.334  0.140  0.000  0.000  0.235 
SCAT  0.271  1.000  1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.447 
BSIZE  6.766  14.000  8.000  7.000  5.000  3.000  2.139 
               
               
The table shows the data of 107 SPI non-financial firms over the period from 1999 to 2003. MOWNER is the percentage 
of shares (capital) hold by insiders. CEOCOB is a dummy variable which takes on the value of one if the CEO and the 
COB is the same person, and zero else. LSHARE denotes the percentage voting rights of the largest shareholder. BLOCK 
is the percentage of total voting rights of shareholders (that are not in the management, on the board, or related to such 
insiders) with more then 5% voting rights. SCAT takes on the value of 1 if a company has more than one share category, 
and zero else. BSIZE is the number of representatives on the board. All variables are observed as of year-end 2003. The 
other firm-specific variables are taken as four year averages from 1999 to 2002 and are explained in the text. The cash ra-
tio is observed as of year-end 2003 and is truncated at the 5% and 95% levels. 29 
 
 
Table 7: Cross-sectional regression results 
             
Variable             
             
             
Dependent  LNCASHN  LNCASHN  LNCASHN  LNCASHN  LNCASHN  LNCASHN 
             
LNSIZE      0.038  0.036  0.035  0.065  0.063  0.061 
            (0.65)  (0.60)  (0.59)  (0.85)  (0.80)  (0.75) 
             
LEV         -3.290  -3.207  -3.182  -2.996  -2.953  -2.934 
            (-1.59)  (-1.50)  (-1.48)  (-1.33)  (-1.29)  (-1.28) 
             
LEV_2       2.806  2.678  2.648  2.659  2.596  2.578 
            (0.78)  (0.73)  (0.72)  (0.68)  (0.65)  (0.65) 
             
RD          -0.933  -0.891  -0.896  -1.082  -1.063  -1.076 
            (-0.4)  (-0.38)  (-0.39)  (-0.44)  (-0.44)  (-0.44) 
             
DIVYIELD    0.878  1.067  0.997  3.208  3.289  3.065 
            (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.46) 
             
TANGF       -0.866  -0.87  -0.873  -0.746  -0.749  -0.745 
            (-1.37)  (-1.36)  (-1.37)  (-1.25)  (-1.25)  (-1.23) 
             
MTBV        0.047  0.049  0.049  0.041  0.042  0.042 
            (1.24)  (1.21)  (1.20)  (1.03)  (1.02)  (1.01) 
             
CFV         1.039  1.027  0.993  1.614  1.609  1.580 
            (0.41)  (0.41)  (0.39)  (0.65)  (0.65)  (0.63) 
             
MOWNER      -5.084**  -5.371*  -5.956  -5.377**  -5.550*  -6.302 
            (-2.23)  (-1.95)  (-1.62)  (-2.10)  (-1.76)  (-1.56) 
             
MOWNER^2      0.509  3.118    0.286  3.458 
              (0.22)  (0.26)    (0.12)  (0.31) 
             
MOWNER^3                                -2.884                              -3.472 
                (-0.23)      (-0.29) 
             
MOWNER*LNSIZE       0.363**        0.363**        0.366**        0.398**        0.399**        0.404**  
            (2.18)  (2.19)  (2.18)  (2.12)  (2.09)  (2.10) 
             
CEOCOB                                                     0.364*         0.364*         0.370*   
                  (1.80)  (1.80)  (1.87) 
             
BSIZE             -0.056  -0.055  -0.054 
                  (-0.99)  (-0.98)  (-0.96) 
             
LSHARE            -0.188  -0.197  -0.196 
                  (-0.32)  (-0.34)  (-0.33) 
             
BLOCK             0.192  0.187  0.158 
                  (0.32)  (0.30)  (0.26) 
             
SCAT              0.062  0.065  0.066 
                  (0.23)  (0.24)  (0.24) 
             
Constant    -1.455  -1.448  -1.439  -1.527  -1.508  -1.462 
            (-1.38)  (-1.37)  (-1.35)  (-1.15)  (-1.11)  (-1.05) 
             
R
2          0.432  0.433  0.433  0.458  0.458  0.458 
R
2 (adj.)        0.324  0.317  0.309  0.316  0.308  0.300 
Jarque-Bera  5.139*           
             
             
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for 107 firms. LNCASHN is truncated at the 5% and 95% levels. The gov-
ernance variables are described in table 6. Robust t-values are shown in parentheses. Dummies for industry classification are in-
cluded in the estimation, but the estimated coefficients as omitted in the table. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 